Igmp protocol pdf s windows 10 crack

Four years ago today, the WannaCry ransomware variant spread like wildfire, infecting and encrypting over 230,000 computers at public- and private-sector organizations worldwide, and inflicting hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars in damage. Less than two short months later, another ransomware attack, NotPetya, again ripped its way through global organizations, temporarily crippling the shipping industry and costing Maersk $300 million alone. Both attacks exploited the same vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Server Message Block version one (SMBv1) protocol, an exploit known as EternalBlue. And yet, today, four years after these devastating attacks took place, ExtraHop research found that SMBv1 is still surprisingly common in enterprise environments. Almost 70% had more than 10 devices still running the protocol. And it's not just SMBv1. Other insecure protocols, including the Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) protocol and the NT LAN Manager (NTLM) protocol, are still in use. And while not inherently insecure, HTTP, which is deeply problematic when used for transmission of sensitive data, is still widely used in enterprise environments. A new ExtraHop report provides insight into how common these insecure protocols are within the enterprise, the risks associated with each, and gives recommendations for eliminating these weak points from your environment. Read on for some highlights, or download the full report. Common Insecure Protocols SMBv1 Protocol Snapshot Introduced: 1983 Deprecated: 2013 Damages associated with protocol: > $1 billion 67% of environments are still running SMBv1 SMBv1 (known originally as CIFS) was notoriously buggy, chatty, and difficult to use, and had major security deficiencies. When Microsoft introduced SMBv2 in 2006 they abandoned the CIFS nomenclature altogether. Six years later, in 2012, Microsoft introduced SMBv3, and in 2013 the company officially deprecated SMBv1. Microsoft actively urged their user community to stop using SMBv1, but with millions of machines using the protocol, many of the warnings, including those from within the Windows Server engineering group, went unheeded. This is why, when EternalBlue and related exploits—known collectively as Eternal(x)—came to light in 2017, SMBv1 was still pervasive in IT environments around the world. LLMNR Protocol Snapshot Introduced: 2007 Deprecated: N/A Damages associated with protocol: Unknown 70% of environments still running LLMNR What is LLMNR? Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) is a protocol that allows name resolution without a DNS server. Essentially, LLMNR is a layer 2 protocol that provides a hostname-to-IP resolution on the basis of a network packet that's transmitted via Port UDP 5355 to the multicast network address (224.0.0.0 through 239.255.255.255). The multicast packet queries all network interfaces looking for any that can self-identify authoritatively as the hostname in the query. LLMNR was originally created as a workaround to enable name resolution in environments in which DNS servers would be impractical, such as small private networks. LLMNR was created as a way to achieve name resolution without the onerous requirements of DNS. The protocol has been (and still is) used by operating systems, including Microsoft Windows, to identify networked devices like file servers. LLMNR Security Concerns While LLMNR provides a DNS-free mechanism for host-name resolution within a local environment, it also provides an avenue of attack for malicious actors. An attacker can use the protocol to trick a victim into revealing user credentials. This is done by leveraging LLMNR to gain access to the user credential hashes, which can then be cracked to reveal actual credentials, especially if older MS password techniques like LANMAN are not disabled. Though DNS is not without its challenges, it's a far more secure way to accurately identify host names. With that said, DNS should be carefully monitored to ensure that it is not itself being utilized for nefarious purposes. NTLMv1 Protocol Snapshot Introduced:1993 Deprecated: 2010 Damages associated with protocol: Unknown 34% of environments still running NTLMv1 What is NTLM? New Technology LAN Manager (NTLM) is a proprietary Microsoft protocol introduced in 1993 to replace Microsoft LAN Manager (LANMAN). NTLM is part of a cohort of Microsoft security protocols designed to collectively provide authentication, integrity, and confidentiality to users. NTLM is what is known as a challenge-response protocol used by servers to authenticate clients using password hashes. In its original incarnation NTLMv1 used a fairly simple (and easily compromised) authentication method. NTLM Security Concerns Using NTLM for authentication exposes organizations to a number of risks. A skilled attacker can easily intercept NTLM hashes that are equivalent to passwords or crack NTLMv1 passwords offline. A successful exploit against NTLMv1 authentication can enable an attacker to launch machine-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks or take complete control of a domain. HTTP Protocol Snapshot Introduced:1991 Deprecated: N/A Damages associated with protocol: > $1 billion 81% of enterprise environments still use insecure HTTP credentials HTTP Security Concerns The original protocol developed in the nineties lacked entirely a way to protect sensitive data—like your credit card number—leaving a massive gap in HTTP security. In 1995, four years after the introduction of HTTP, its more secure version, HTTPS, arrived on the scene. Unlike HTTP, HTTPS uses TLS to encrypt the communications between clients and servers, preventing people from intercepting and reading your data in flight. It also preserves the integrity of data, helping to prevent it from being broken or corrupted. While HTTP is not inherently problematic, its use for transmission of sensitive data is definitely a major risk. When plaintext credentials are transmitted over HTTP, those credentials are left exposed, the internet equivalent of shouting passwords across a crowded room, making it trivial for anyone to intercept and steal those credentials. 81% of enterprise environments is a concerningly large percentage. It surfaces the question of whether organizations may be unaware that this is happening in their environment. Heartbleed Of course, even HTTPS isn't foolproof. Heartbleed, a serious vulnerability in OpenSSL that first came to light in 2014, is a classic example of how HTTPS can be exploited. Under normal conditions, SSL/TLS encryption protects information—such as logins and credit card numbers—being transmitted over the internet. The Heartbleed vulnerability inadvertently exposed the memory of systems protected by OpenSSL, compromising the secret keys used to encrypt the traffic and giving attackers access to users names, passwords, and other sensitive information. Because HTTP or HTTPS are often used to transmit user input from websites and web applications, the protocols are sometimes abused to transmit malicious content from the public internet into a private environment. For example, an attacker using the SQL injection tactic sends SQL statements hidden in HTTP headers or other user-manipulatable fields in the HTTP protocol. The encryption used by HTTPS can actually make it more challenging to detect SQL injection attacks. Even with vulnerabilities like Heartbleed, HTTPS is still far more secure than HTTP for transmission of sensitive information. Hi, I have a firewall rule set to block everything that I have not expressly allowed through my WAN interface. I'm seeing lots of IGMP packets getting blocked from Source: 99.239.247.53, which is outside of my network. The destination is 224.0.0.1, which I believe is a reserved IP range for multicast. How are these packets able to be directed to my network if they have a destination of 224.0.0.1? Also, don't know anything about IGMP Snooping other than it's a technique used by hackers to gain information, but is it possible this is a hacker trying to get information on my systems? I don't understand why this random IP would be sending IGMP packets directed towards my network as I do not host any public servers or services. I uploaded a snapshot from my log to show what I'm seeing... Any thoughts on what might be happening here? Aren't mDNS (multicast DNS) packets sourced from unicast address, port 53 to a few different mcast addresses? If so, and assuming your WAN interface is some kind of broadband (say cable), it's possible the something upstream is configured to allow the multicast traffic down the shared pipe so it hits your WAN. If something local has configured your WAN to be part of that mcast group, the packets would also be routed from upstream to your WAN Could they be nefarious? Maybe Could they be begnin? Maybe You could do a packet capture and try and analyze them. You could do a whois on the source IP, if it's from one of your neighbors it would probably be in a block of IPS assigned to your ISP. My opinion, others may have a different opinion. EDIT: Quick look mDNS look to be sourced from port 5353 destined for 224.0.0.251. @spookymonkey said in Blocked IGMP packets flooding my logs -- IGMP snooping???: I don't understand why this random IP would be sending IGMP packets directed towards That IP is owned by NetRange: 99.239.246.0 - 99.239.247.255 CIDR: 99.239.246.0/23 Parent: ROGERS-COM-HSD (NET-99-224-0-0-1) Customer: Rogers Cable Inc. ETOB (C02173521) Is Rogers your ISP? What it amounts to is spam from your local ISP most likely - them not correctly filtering multicast. If your concerned contact your ISP about it. The only way you would be able to see such traffic if your isp is sending it, or another one of their clients is sending it. if it is filling up your logs vs interesting stuff your wanting to see, I would just stop it from being logged. Create a rule to block it and not log it above your Bock ALL rule.. BTW you understand pfsense does that out of the box anyway. There is little reason to create your own rule that logs, since that is what the default deny rule does anyway. @spookymonkey That's definitely someone on your subnet? What's your gateway address? I'm also on Rogers, but in Mississauga, not Etobicoke (Toronto) and don't see anything like that. My gateway is 99.246.124.1 and ends in .1, as is typical. @johnpoz Thanks for the info! Yup on Rogers... Didn't realize pfsense auto blocked/logged by default so that's good to know. But I am still a tad paranoid so I think I'm going to keep them in there anyway lol... @jknott gateway is 99.241.10.1 so different from yours.. ever since I installed pfsense and ditched my home router, I can barely sleep at night after seeing the traffic logs... is it normal to constantly be bombarded by external IPs on various ports??? When I research the ports they're trying to use it usually turns up a vulnerability associated to the port.... lots of them are directed at DNS port 53 , but I don't operate any public servers or services so not sure why random public IPs would be sending requests to my IP on port 53... @spookymonkey said in Blocked IGMP packets flooding my logs -- IGMP snooping???: constantly be bombarded by external IPs on various ports??? Yes the internet is a noisy place.. No different than when you had your soho router.. Your soho router wasn't just showing you it in a log.. random public IPs would be sending requests to my IP on port 53... Prob looking for open dns resolver that they could use in a dns amplification attack. BTW - I had set a sniff on my wan to look for the igmp.. And seeing it as well 10:06:37.270045 IP 10.205.128.1 > 224.0.0.1: igmp 10:08:42.277695 IP 10.205.128.1 > 224.0.0.1: igmp 10:10:47.288287 IP 10.205.128.1 > 224.0.0.1: igmp 10:12:52.297471 IP 10.205.128.1 > 224.0.0.1: igmp 10:14:57.307060 IP 10.205.128.1 > 224.0.0.1: igmp 10:17:02.317600 IP 10.205.128.1 > 224.0.0.1: igmp 10:19:07.327589 IP 10.205.128.1 > 224.0.0.1: igmp 10:21:12.336376 IP 10.205.128.1 > 224.0.0.1: igmp 10:23:17.346039 IP 10.205.128.1 > 224.0.0.1: igmp 10:25:22.356011 IP 10.205.128.1 > 224.0.0.1: igmp 10:27:27.366969 IP 10.205.128.1 > 224.0.0.1: igmp 10:29:32.376429 IP 10.205.128.1 > 224.0.0.1: igmp That is on my WAN... but its a rfc1918 address.. But yeah coming from isp network. As @johnpoz says, the internet is noisy. A lot of people don't seem to understand that; especially your broadband connection. A cable is basically a shared segment with all of your neighbors :) Some things like FiOS I think are more point to point so you don't see your neighbors traffic. 224.0.0.1 or any other multicast address isn't really targeted at you, it's basically "routed/sent to anyone that has joined the multicast group". If it hits your WAN interface and you don't have an active membership in that group, it gets dropped by the stack at some point, even without the firewall (just basic networking as long as the interface is not in promiscuous mode). When I first got my broadband connection I just put a throwaway device and just packet captured for a bit to see what was out there. pfSense is built on some good technology; starting with a "default deny" stance on WAN is a simple way to avoid a lot of nastiness. Also to the 53 traffic - yup seeing that as well But see more to ssh, telnet and 21 (ftp) and the always present sql 1433.. Lots of common ports that get scanned all the time. @johnpoz The only way that makes sense is ISP using that block of addresses on the "inside" of their network. It's not good sense, but a possibility. Assuming your WAN is DHCP is it getting an address in the same space and gateway in that block too? Looking at logs and periodic sniffing is a really good way for one to start banging heads over what should be common sense. Edit: antispoof on (interface) :) @mer said in Blocked IGMP packets flooding my logs -- IGMP snooping???: he only way that makes sense is ISP using that block of addresses on the "inside" of their network. Yeah for sure - its just isp noise.. you should of seen the flood of dhcp traffic use to see before they cleaned that up.. Its noise - nothing more, nothing less. I sure don't log it. I only log common udp ports and SYN tcp traffic. @johnpoz Broadband to the home is teaching people not in the industry all kinds of new things. Easy to get too worked up over something that is the equivalent of "I'd like to talk about your car's extended warranty" phone call. But it also useful to show someone "why" you lock things down. Took a while for my wife to understand, but it's fun listening to her call out others on "That's dumb, why would you do that". @mer said in Blocked IGMP packets flooding my logs -- IGMP snooping???: equivalent of "I'd like to talk about your car's extended warranty" phone call. Hey I have gotten like 3 or 4 of those in a day sometimes - ticks me off. More so that they are getting ripped off with whatever data they are buying. I have not had to worry about a warranty or extended warranty in year and years. Since I only lease going on 10 years. They getting ripped off for data on who might be interested in a warranty that is for sure.. I hit a point in my life where I had my last car for 13 years.. And said F this, I want to drive new - and a lease kind of forces my hand to get a new one every 3 years. But those get annoying - more so then some noise on my wan ;) Lately they have switched to sexy time woman voice - heheh The other noise on your wan sort of calls is the that your SS card has been used fraudulently.. Not sure why the phone companies don't crack down on those to be honest.. But hey they getting paid for the call for sure.. Even if only a fraction of penny per call, 100 million of those add up ;) @spookymonkey said in Blocked IGMP packets flooding my logs -- IGMP snooping???: gateway is 99.241.10.1 so different from yours I expected that. My point was to show it wasn't the gateway, which means it could be from another customer. If your subnet mask is /23, as mine is, then that address is not within your subnet, which is strange as multicasts are generally not passed through routers. Some traffic is normally visible on the WAN, but what you're describing doesn't sound normal. Perhaps you should call support and tell them what you see. I can ping that address, but traceroute dies after 6 hops. The last hop I recognize is the Rogers office on Bloor at Jarvis and the last hop appears to be a Rogers management router, but nothing to indicate location. Rogers Etobicoke office is on Greensboro Dr., near Kipling & 401. Do you see anything funny on IPv6? Also, Rogers has IPTV but that's usually carried on IPv6. @johnpoz okay good to know the IGMP stuff is likely just noise... but I don't think the other stuff that's being directed at my IP is just noise though, this is just in a space of a few minutes @spookymonkey /etc/services has mapping of port to service. 23 is telnet, 22 ssh, 5060 is a standard SIP port, Potentially malicious, "script kiddies". It may not really be "directed" at you, more likely directed at "oh, there's an IP lets see what ports are open". But that is the beauty of the default deny rule on WAN. @mer cool good to know about /etc/services .. I just setup a home lab recently to start studying for oscp so got lots of learning to do with linux :).. if these are botnets/script kiddies just running through tons of different scans/attacks on virtually all IPs (not just mine) at all minutes of the day then the internet is pretty [expletive] up lol... @spookymonkey said in Blocked IGMP packets flooding my logs -- IGMP snooping???: then the internet is pretty [expletive] up lol... Yes, Yes it is. Biggest thing is ask questions. Lots of knowledge here, lots in different forums. Lots of really good PF references around (OpenBSD mailing lists) that in general talk about good/proper network security. For me, the biggest things are: Start at default deny I personally like default deny on all interfaces (except lo), not just WAN, but others have different opinion which is fine. Know what is on your network Know what you want to allow Network security, I believe "no dumb questions" so asking is never a bad thing. Edit: Oh, make sure you have some Windows machines on your home network and grab the traffic to see how chatty they are. @mer Thanks! I have a managed switch that I just setup with 802.1q VLANs and have each VLAN along with the physical LAN interface set to block all IPV6 allow IPV4 http/https/ntp/dns deny all IPV4* with a couple exceptions for my wife's VPN for work so hopefully I didn't miss anything with this setup :S I have a win10 machine I just got up and running in my proxmox box yesterday and have already noticed weird stuff getting blocked from pfBlockerNG and other random outbound traffic blocked in my firewall rules... I plan to eventually get a flip phone and ditch all the big tech garbage, but don't know how feasible that will be at this point!!!! Eventually when I learn about packet capturing/analysis, I'm sure I'll have much more to complain about... @spookymonkey It's been a while, but I started with default deny all-interfaces, skip lo0 then started adding allow rules. Suprisingly few are actually needed, less than a dozen. Windows Updates does some weird stuff to broadcast and port 0 but for normal operations the allowed list is pretty short. You wind up seeing some "co-opting" of protocols (something that is normally TCP only Google decided to use it as UDP for something) so you need to adjust things. Packet capture/analysis: google up Wireshark. Lots of good information. You can wind up banging your head, so pick one thing and trace it (NTP is a good one to start with I think). It's not just about the packets, it's about the contents of the packets and the protocols (TCP vs UDP) so get used to looking at specific bits in packets. Can make your head hurt at times, but what you see on the wire is what you are working with. pfSense and pretty much every other commercial solution has a "default deny in WAN, allow all out WAN". It's the best way to get things to work, but I think you need to keep an eye on the LAN side to make sure you don't leak things (my opinion figure out what is best for you). Most important: have fun.

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